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The Savings and, Loan Debacle
by Margaret Landman
Department ofEconomics
The recent experiences of the savings and loan industry, with
the mounting insolvencies and losses, are giving the world a
first-hand example of how a fmancial system should not
operate. A number of economic factors, combined with a
series of regulatory errors, have contributed to the substantial
difficulties encountered by savings and loan institutions during
the last decade. At last count, the cost of the bailout to
taxpayers is expected to exceed $200 billion (plus $300 billion
interest), but if the current downturn in the economy and real
estate markets worsens, this could increase signiflcantly as
now-solvent institutions are jeopardized.
The potential for disaster in the S&L industry has existed
since its inception. Modem savings and loans, also known as
thrifts, have roots going back to building societies, which
pooled members' savings and provided mortgages. In the
U.S., the first such organization was the Oxford Provident,
formed in Pennsylvania in 1831. It accepted small deposits
(which then, and even now, are discouraged by many commer-
cial banks) and, when $500 accumulated in the fund, made a
loan to the member willing to pay the highest interest rate. As
the S&Ls evolved from these early building societies, they
continued to serve the purpose of pooling depositors' savings
for home mortgages. Indeed, until the early 1980s, they were
prohibited from offering other types of services such as
checking accounts or business and consumer loans. This lack
of diversification left the S&Ls vulnerable to fluctuations in
real estate values and in interest rates.
In addition to the limitation on the types of assets which
could be held, diversiflcation was also restricted by the bans on
interstate banking placed both on commercial banks and S&Ls.
In fact, many states did not allow banking institutions to open
more than one branch. These restrictions were enacted to
prevent domination of the banking industry by a few large
institutions. The S&Ls were kept small and their mortgages
were concentrated in the surrounding communities. The S&Ls'
fortunes, then, were strongly dependent on local economic
conditions.
S&Ls, like commercial banks, experienced severe difficulties
during the Great Depression. Interest rate ceilings on commer-
cial banks and federal deposit insurance were introduced in
order to protect depositors, prevent bank runs, and stabilize the
banking system. After some debate about whether deposit
insurance would create a moral hazard (in which the existence
of insurance could cause the insured to take greater risk), the
FDIC was established in 1933 for commercial banks and the
FSLIC in 1934 for S&Ls. The armual premiums were set for
each banking institution as a percentage of its total deposits.
The size of these funds was never adequate for dealing with
large numbers of failures. Although the original goal was to
have a reserve fund equal to 5% of deposits, it never actually
exceeded 2%. The low premium rates, coupled with the growth
in deposits and a series of increases in the maximum coverage
to the current level of $100,000, led to reduced insurance
coverage and increased taxpayer risk.
For a while, the deposit insurance system seemed to work.
Bank runs were all but eliminated as insurance restored deposi-
tors' confidence. The S&L industry further improved as the
post-World War IT housing boom created a large demand for
mortgages. In 1966, interest rate restrictions were also placed
on S&Ls, but in order to allow them to aggressively compete for
savings deposits, the limits were set 1/4% higher than the banks
could offer. Still, trouble began to surface in the 1960s, when
inflation nudged Treasury bill rates above those offered by
banks and S&Ls, and funds began to leave the banking system.
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This process of disintennediation accelerated in the 1970s when
inflation fueled by OPEC oil price increases pushed interest
rates to record high levels. Many of the savers' dollars flowed
into the newly-fonned money market mutual funds, which
pooled the savings of small depositors and bought T-bills, large
denomination CDs, and other money market instruments.
Because they were not subject to interest rate ceilings, the
money market mutual funds could offer higher yields.
Faced with a large loss in business, the S&Ls and banks
successfully lobbied Congress for changes to allow them to
compete. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and
Monetary Control Act of 1980 and the Gam - St. Gennain Act
of 1982 introduced a number of changes in the banking indus-
try. Interest rate ceilings were phased out and all depository
institutions, including S&Ls, were allowed to offer money
market deposit accounts and interest-bearing personal checking
accounts called NOW accounts. S&Ls, which had been
particularly hard hit by the interest rate increases due to their
large mortgage holdings, were given expanded investment
powers. Now they could diversify their portfolios by acquiring
junk bonds and corporate equities, as well as consumer loans.
In addition, minimum net worth requirements were lowered, so
that the owners did not have to put up as much of their own
money. Accounting standards were also loosened, causing
some insolvent S&Ls to appear healthy.
Although the large interest rate increases in the 1970s had set
the S&Ls difficulties in motion, the subsequent decreases in the
early 1980s did not solve their problems. As the S&Ls moved
into new, riskier ventures, they lacked both the knowledge and
the caution to enter these activities. With essentially very little
of their own money at risk, it was a gamble which, if it paid off,
would benefit the stockholders, but if it lost, would be paid for
by others. As one developer-turned-banker was quoted, "I am
tired of playing Monopoly with my own money..... This way,
we can use the depositors' money."
After a while, even the new creative accounting gimmicks
could not disguise the massive insolvencies. The FSLIC, itself
technically bankrupt, did not have enough funds to shut down
the hundreds of insolvent S&Ls and to payoff the depositors.
Instead, it began to look for merger solutions. Some of these
were successful, such as the 1982 Citicorp takeover of Fidelity
Savings of San Francisco. Through this and subsequent S&L
purchases, Citicorp gained an exemption from national branch-
ing laws and, by the end of 1984, owned the sixth largest S&L
group in the United States. Other mergers, however, were not
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so successful. With little money down and generous aid from
the FSLIC, unscrupulous individuals were able to gain control
of a number of S&Ls and convert them to their own personal
piggy banks. Investigations by the FSLIC, the IRS, and the FBI
have shown that billions were diverted from the S&Ls for
private use. Government-insured deposits were used to finance
lavish parties and trips, personal loans, excessive salaries and
bonuses, private planes, and extravagant offices (and even a
gold-plated toilet). Furthennore, fraudulent loans were made to
friends and associates based on artificially inflated appraisals.
Property could then be bought with no money down, and when
the borrowers could not make the payments, the S&Ls would
simply lend them more.
In theory, bank examiners should have uncovered and exposed
such activities immediately. In practice, however, there were
insufficient examiners to handle the growning number of
problem S&Ls, and they were often underpaid and unqualified.
Further, as Richard Pratt, chainnan of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board from 1981-83, recently testified before the House
Banking Committee, the Reagan administration tried to stop the
Bank Board from seizing insolvent thrifts and the Office of
Management and Budget cut supervisory staff. Requests for
more examiners by Edwin Gray, chainnan from 1983-87, were
also denied.
The government is now belatedly engaged in an extensive
investigation of S&L practices during this period of unre-
strained operation. A three-year-old multi-agency task force in
Dallas has filled 14,000 square feet of office and warehouse
space with subpoenaed documents. Millions of pages of fman-
cial statements, loan applications, cancelled checks, and other
material must be analyzed, making the process of fmding
enough evidence for an indictment for fraud extremely complex.
So far, charges have been brought against seventy-seven
people, with fifty-two convictions and only two acquittals. in-
creasingly, defendants are receiving prison tenns, including a
thirty-year sentence for the fonner head of the now-defunct
Vernon Savings and Loan in Dallas. Even with convictions, it
is expected that little of the tens of billions of dollars that have
been lost in the S&L disaster will ever be recovered. Fines and
restitution are rarely more than a few million dollars in anyone
case. Many of the S&L industry losses are sunk into failed mall
and condominium projects and worthless junk bonds, so are es-
sentially unrecoverable.
The effects of the S&L debacle go well beyond the massive
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financial communities has been dis-
rupted. The net outflow of funds from
the S&Ls and the current crackdown on
lending practices has caused a credit
crunch in some areas, hurting legitimate
borrowers for housing and other needs.
Deposit insurance premiums, which had
remained 8.33 cents per $100 of deposits
from 1935 until last year's increase to 12
cents, are slated for another jump to 19.5
cents in January 1991. This will reduce
S&L and bank profits, causing losses to
stockholders and perhaps even more
failures. This increase in costs will also
make it more difficult for U.S. institu-
tions to compete internationally. In
Japan, for instance, deposit insurance
premiums are only 1 cent per $100.
A further effect is a massive regional
redistribution of wealth, as most states
will receive less in bailout money than
they will pay in additional federal taxes.
Professor Edward W. Hill of Cleveland
State University has estimated that the
bailout will redistribute wealth from
thirty-seven states and the District of Co-
lumbia to the thirteen states where most
of the failures occurred. Massachusetts is
expected to be one of the biggest losers,
with relatively few S&L insolvencies and
relatively high income taxes. In addition,
cuts in defense spend~g, spurred in part
by the budgetary pressures of the bailout,
will exacerbate its woes. Texas, on the
other hand, is the largest net gainer, since
it pays 7% of total federal taxes but is
slated to receive 60% of the bailout
funding. In effect, the system rewards
those regions with the most fraud,
corruption, and mismanagement. Recent
oil price increases are likely to enlarge
these regional inequities as the Northeast
consumers lose and the Southwest
producers gain.
Solutions to the S&L problem are now
being developed and implemented. The
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery,
and Enforcement Act of 1989, restruc-
tures the entire S&L industry. The lopg-
dead FSLIC was finally put to rest and
replaced by the Savings Association
Insurance Fund, an agency of the FDIC.
Minimum capital standards have been
increased and lax accounting principles
tightened. The Resolution Trust Corpora-
tion (RTC) was created to oversee the
liquidation of assets from insolvent
S&Ls, including everything from
mortgages to junk bonds to gold-plated
toilets. The RTC was given $50 billion
in initial funding last year, which is being
used to operate seized S&Ls and to cover
insured deposits when the thrifts are sold
to new owners.
Still, a number of further changes must
be made in order to restore stability to the
fmancial system. The deposit insurance
system needs to be reformed with an eye
to giving depositors incentives to
examine the safety of particular banking
institutions, while at the same time
limiting taxpayer liability in the event of
losses. Treasury Undersecretary Robert
Glauber recently stated that the $100,000
limit is unlikely to be lowered, but that he
may recommend a limit on the total
number of insured deposits an insured
depositor may have. This method, known
as a "haircut," would provide the wealthy
with a reason to investigate the fmancial
condition of a savings and loan or bank,
and not merely search the country for the
highest possible yield. Another option
would be to base a banking institution's
premiums on the riskiness of its assets
and activities, just as a skydiver pays
more for life insurance. Some have
called for a repeal of deposit insurance
altogether, but this radical move could
lead to bank runs like those experienced
in the U.S. before 1933. For instance, in
1985, there were runs on non-FSLIC
insured institutions in Ohio, Maryland,
and Rhode Island, when depositors
became concerned that losses to the bank
could exceed the state deposit insurance
funds.
Much might be learned from the Danish
banking system, which is considered to
be one of the strongest in the world even
though, until recently, it had no deposit
insurance. (This was only introduced in
1988 in anticipation of European Com-
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It seems clear that in order
to compete effectively both
at home and abroad, the
antiquated, crazy-quilt U.S.
banking system must be
overhauled.
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munity regulations.) Instead, the Danish government relies on an aggressive policy of
examining bank soundness. All the bank's assets are monitored and shown on the
books at current market value, not historical value as in the U.S., so that losses are
immediately reflected in the balance sheet. Portfolios are highly diversified and
mortgages comprise only a small part of a bank's assets. The government sets high net
worth standards, and when these are not met, banks are promptly closed. In the rare
event that there is not enough net worth to protect the depositors, the government steps
in to do so at taxpayer expense.
Canada's banking system has also proven to be much more stable than that of the U.S.
Theirs is a more cent~alized system, with relatively few banks operating with a large
number of branches. The Canadian government does provide deposit insurance, but
payouts are relatively rare. (In fact, from 1923 to 1985 there were no bank failures at
all in Canada, compared to 9,000 in the U.S. during 1930-33 alone.) Private monitoring
of a bank's financial condition by other banks helps to supplement regulators' efforts
and prevent potentially contagious bank runs. Like the Danish banks, Canadian banks
engage in a much wider range of activities than do their U.S. counterparts.
The U.S., in fact, is the only major country without a true national banking system
because of the existence of so many state and federal laws governing interstate banking
and, except for Japan, is the only one that places substantial limits on the types of
financial products and services that may be offered by banking institutions. It seems
clear that in order to compete effectively both at home and abroad, the antiquated,
crazy-quilt U.S. banking system must be overhauled. Prohibitions on branching and
interstate banking should be lifted, enabling S&Ls and banks to diversify geographi-
cally and to reach a more efficient scale of operations. U.S. banks have been the world
leaders in devising new financial products and should be given the freedom to further
develop their expertise. The distinctions between banks and S&Ls will become increas-
ingly blurred as all financial institutions become more diversified.
At the same time, more rigorous supervision of each institution's balance sheet must
be exercised in order to ensure the depositors' safety. Minimum capital standards,
based on current market valuations of assets, should be raised and strictly enforced.
Although such supervision is costly, the gain of having a stable banking system would
surely outweigh the expense. The justification for increased regulation can be summed
up by this recent statement from one economist: "There are a lot of honey pots out
there. As long as there are bears around, we need regulation."
It is also crucial that Congress continue to fund the RTC budget, which is already
running low. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that shutting down the bailout
process for even three months would add at least $300 million (not counting interest) to
the cost. As the experiences of the last decade have shown, failure to deal with the
problem now can lead to far greater difficulties later on.
Taking steps to handle the crisis and institute reform would help limit present and
future taxpayer liability. As the taxpayers' blank check is removed, a measure of
market discipline would be instilled in the system through monitoring by large deposi-
tors, stockholders, and banking institutions. Although the lessons learned from the
savings and loan crisis are costly ones, perhaps they will result in a strengthening of the
U.S. financial system in the years to come.~
